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to obligations incurred prior to the passage of the law. The idea
of property in men has grown gradually weaker, and since the
abolishment of imprisonment for debt, has nearly vanished.
In lieu thereof, the state for its own purposes and the well-
being of the individual and family, has secured what are deemed
necessaries against the claims of creditors, and directed the latter
to look to the integrity and property of his debtor for security.
Exemption laws now exist in all the states, and are deservedly
becoming more and more popular. There is something so humane
underlying them, that courts will not interfere unless they violate
a plain mandate of the organic law.
We find nothing in the provisions of the Bankrupt Law which
we are now considering, that is in violation of the Constitution
of the United States. The order of the District Court is
affirmed.
MILLER, J., concurred.
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AGENT. See Master, &c.; Pleading.
Suit between Consignor and Factor-Order to Factor to sell-
Advances by Factor-Right to determine when to sell.-In a suit be-
tween a consignor and his factors who had made advances on the con-
signment nearly equal to its value-the allegation of the consignor
1 From J. Win. Wallace, Esq.; to appear in vols. 10 and 11 of his reports.
2 From J. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 32 Indiana Rep.
s From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 57 Maine Rep.
4 From C. C. Whittlesey, Esq., late Reporter; to appear in 46 or 47 Mo. Rep.
5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 57 of his reports.
6 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 63 Penna. State Rep.
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being non-compliance by the factors with his orders to sell-the alleged
order being, however, but a verbal one, and a conflict of testimony
existing as to whether such an order was given at all, an instruction
was rightly refused to the consignor which rested the liability of the
factor on the bare fact of an order to sell, and which made no allusion
either to the advances or to the fact that three weeks after the alleged
order was given, the factors wrote to their consignor a letter informing
him that they had not sold his goods, as the market had been dull and
on the decline every day since he left them; that the goods would not
then sell for more than so much (a decline on former prices); that they
would be compelled to sell unless he made other shipments, or remitted
cash as a margin, the money market being tight; that they had held on
thus far to meet his views, but that the declining tendency of the market
induced them to write, and asking to hear from him on his receipt of
their letter, which letter the consignor received, but purposely declined
to answer: Feild v. Farrington, 10 or 11 Wall.
When factors have made large advances or incurred expense on
account of the consignment, the principal cannot by any subsequent
orders control their right to sell at such a time, as in the exercise of a
sound discretion, and in accordance with the usage of trade, they may
deem best to secure indemnity to themselves, and to promote the in-
terest of the consignor; they acting of course in good faith and with
reasonable skill: Id.
The effect of a refusal by the consignor to reply to such a letter as
that mentioned in the paragraph next but one above, within a reasonable
time after he received it, was to raise a presumption that he approved
of what his factors had done, so far as their letter informed him, and
in the absence of anything to rebut that presumption, he was to be
regarded as having consented to whatever delay had occurred in effect-
ing a sale, even though the delay was contrary to his directions: Id.
The receipt and non-acknowledgment of such a letter would not,
however, relieve the factors from a continuing obligation to sell within a
reasonable time after sending it off, all the circumstances of the case
being considered, and at the best prices that could be obtained : Id.
Hence where, after mailing such a letter, the factors did not sell for
nearly ten months afterwards, the market declining all the while: Beld,
though the letter was never acknowledged, that it was a question which
should have been submitted to the jury whether the long delay to sell
in view of a market falling all the while, was in the exercise of sound
discretion, good faith, and reasonable diligence; and that an instruction
that the consignors should bear all losses sustained after a refusal to
answer the factor's letter, without excepting such portion of the loss as
iight have been caused by the factor's fault, was error : Id.
Can not make profit for himself out of his Princpal's Property.-The
managing agent of a steamboat employed to secure freights and make
contracts, cannot speculate for his own private advantage with the busi-
ness intrusted to him. If he make a contract in his own name for
freight which is carried out by the boat, he will be compelled to ac-
count for the sums received by him to his co-owners, notwithstanding he
may have owned the larger share of the boat: Rea et al. v. Copelin,
46 or 47 Mo.
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AsSUMPSIT.
Contract-Member of Family-Liability for Board.-Where a man
lives in the family of his son-in-law, such marriage connection rebuts
any presumption of an implied promise of the father-in-law to pay for
board which would exist in the absence of such a relation between the
parties: Daubenspeck, Executor, v. Powers, 32 Ind.
ATTACHMENT.
Whether an action in rem or in personam-Alust be a Levy on Property
as Foundation of .Jurisdiction-Regularity of Proceedings.-Proceedings
to- enforce a debt or demand by attachment of the defendant's property
partake of the character of suits both in rem and inpersonam : Cooper
v. Reynolds, 10 or 11 Wall.
If there is a personal service of the process on the defendant or
personal appearance by him, the case is mainly a personal action; but
if in the absence of either of these the property is attached and sold,
it becomes essentially a proceeding in rem and is governed by principles
applicable to that class of actions: Id.
In this class of cases the court cannot proceed without a levy on the
property of the defendant; and the judgment binds nothing but the
property attached: Id.
The seizure of the property of the defendant under the proper pro-
cess of the court, is, therefore, the foundation of the court's jurisdic-
tion, and defective or irregular affidavits and publication of notice,
though they might reverse a judgment in such case for error in depart-
ing from the directions of the statute, do not render such a judgment
void: Id.
Where there is a valid writ and levy, a judgment of the court, an order
of sale, and a sale and sheriff's deed, the proceeding cannot be held
void when introduced collaterally in another suit: Id.
BOND.
Reforming.-A bond will not be reformed by striking out portions
alleged to be erroneous, where there is no evidence to show that it
was not drawn in exact conformity to the agreement previously made
between the parties, but on the contrary the complaint alleges that the
bond was drawn according to such agreement, and it is clear that both
obligor and obligee understood that the bond should contain the
provisions sought to be stricken out: Garner v. Bird et aL, Ex'rs., 57
Barb.
The fact that the obligor employed a lawyer, who gave him bad ad-
vice, and thereby deceived him as to his rights, and induced him to
execute the bond, furnishes no authority to the court to alter the con-
tract of the parties: Id.
BOUNDARY.
Deed referring to .Map or Plat-Evidence dehors the Deed to show
the Line.-A deed which refers to a plat of the land for one of the lines
of the boundary, may be read in evidence to the jury without the pro-
duction of the plat, subject to an identification of such line by competent
evidence during the progress of the trial: Dreenj v. Cray, 10 Wall.
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A deed which refers to such a plat for one line, or which authorizes
the line to be run by a certain person according to such a plat, is not
void for uncertainty on its face : Id.
In case of such a deed made a great many years ago, though the plat
is not produced, it is competent to show by other proof, written or parol,
or both, that such a line existed and where it was located: Id.
This may be shown by long possession on each side of the line, evi-
denced by a fence, by the parol declarations of the parties holding
under the deed on each side of the line, or by any facts which clearly
establish the existence of such a line and its location: Id.
Hearsay Evidence-Ancient Maps and Surveys.-In trespass q. c.
"not guilty" puts the plaintiff's possession in issue, which the defendant
may disprove by proving his own ancient and continued possession of
the locus in quo: Mec Causland v. Fleming, 63 Penna.
Pedigree and boundary are the excepted cases wherein reputation and
nearsay of deceased persons are received in evidence: Id.
Ancient maps and surveys are evidence to elucidate and ascertain
boundary and fix monuments: Id.
No drafts when offered for title will be received except they bear
an official character; and in this they differ from those offered to show
boundary: Id.
A party claimed to what was known as the "Taylor line." On the
trial he offered a draft dated forty-five years previously, proved to have
been in the possession of a former owner, who claimed by it thirty-five
years before, and proved also to be the handwriting of Taylor, who was
a surveyor, and was dead. Hfeld, to be evidence of boundary: Id.
BROKER. See Evidence.
C0 MMON CARRIER.
Negligence-Act of God or the Public Enemy.-When a common
carrier shows that a loss was by some vis major as by flood, he is excused
without proving affirmatively that he was guilty of no negligence : Rail-
road Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall.
The proof of such negligence, if the negligence is asserted to exist,
rests on the other party: Id.
In case of a loss of which the proximate cause is the act of God or
the public enemy, the common carrier is excused, though his own negli-
gence or laches may have contributed as a remote cause: Id.
The maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur applies to such cases
as to other contracts and transactions, and ordinary diligence is all that
is required of the carrier to avoid or remedy the effects of the over-
powering cause: Id.
The mere promise of a carrier, made without additional consideration,
to forward freight already on the route by an earlier train than usual, is
not evidence from which a jury may infer a special contract to do so:
Id.
Towboats.-Steam towboats or tugs are not common carriers as
regards the vessels they have in tow and their cargoes. The common-
law rule as to common carriers applied to goods only, and not to vessels:
Brown v. Clegg, 63 Penna.
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CONPEDERATE STATES. See lhternational Law.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Descent.
Limitations-Lex Fori.-The statute of the state where the suit is
brought is alone applicable to a cause of action accruing in another
state: Carson v. Hunter, 46 or 47 Mo.
CONTRACT.
Covenant to Forbear-Breach of.-A covenant or agreement to for-
bear to sue on an obligation for a limited time after maturity of such
obligation, though founded on a sufficient consideration, cannot be
pleaded as a release, or in bar of an action on such obligation brought
within the time limited. In such case, the defendant sued is left to his
action for a breach of the covenant or agreement: Irons v. WooIfill,
32 Ind.
Illegal Consideration.-A promissory note, given for the purchase of
slaves taken from Missouri and sold in Arkansas after the date of the
President's proclamation of August 18th 1861, forbidding commercial
intercourse with the insurgent states, is founded upon an illegal con-
sideration and is void: Carson v. Hunter, 46 or 47 Mo.
Dependent Contracts.-Where a note is given in consideration of the
purchase which is to be conveyed upon payment of the money, the
payee cannot recover upon the note without tender of a conveyance:
Dietrich v. Franz, 46 or 47 Mo.
CORPORATION.
Promissory Note-Signature.-The secretary of the "Neal Manu-
facturing Co., Madison, Ind.," gave a promissory note, in which were
the words "we promise," &c., signed in his own name, with " S e c'y"
affixed thereto, and bearing the seal of said corporation. Held, that he
was not personally liable on the note. Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind.
CRIMINAL LAw.
Ohio River-Boundary of the State-Jurisdiction.-A county of
this state lying along the Ohio river is bounded, on the side adjoining
that river, by low-water mark; and the boundary of Kentucky opposite
to such county is low-water mark on the Indiana side of the river. The
proper courts of such county have concurrent jurisdiction with the
courts of Kentucky over crimes committed on said river opposite to
such county: Carlisle v. The State, 32 Ind.
Venue- Variance.-A variance between the allegation in an indict-
ment as to the place where the offence was committed and the proof on
the trial, the place not being a part of the description of the offence,
and both places being within the jurisdiction of the court, is not mate-
rial: Id.
An indictment for murder, in the Circuit Court of the county of
Spencer, charged the offence to have been committed "at and in the
said county of Spencer." The evidence tended to prove that the crime
was committed on the Ohio river opposite to said county, below low-
water mark. Held, that the variance was immaterial: Id.
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DEBT. See Master and Servant.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Evidence; Husband and Wife.
Fraudulent Assignment-Set-off.-If an insolvent debtor take notes
payable to his wife, the consideration moving from him, with intent to
hinder and delay his creditors, the notes will be treated as an assignment
of the debt to the wife and fraudulent as to creditors. If the payees
of the note when sued by the wife have a claim against the husband
which would be a competent set-off at law, they may plead this debt as
an equitable set-off against the wife, the husband being insolvent: Repp#
v. Reppy, 46 or 47 Mo.
Fraudulent Conversion of Debtor's Property.-Although one may
have intended to defraud the creditors of another by taking and con-
verting his property into cash, such intention will be rendered harmless
by his delivering the proceeds of the sale to the debtor, or his wife as
authorized agent: Cramer, Receiver, &c., v. Blood, 57 Barb.
And if he subsequently receives a portion of such proceeds, with like
intent, from the debtor's agent, for the use of the debtor and his wife,
and to be handed over to them or for their use as they may want, such
intent will be rendered harmless by his paying over the money to cre-
ditors, or to the debtor or his wife by his directions : 1l.
Rights of Subsequent Judgment Creditors.-A settlement between
such person and the debtor, and payment of the amount due for such
property or its proceeds, will discharge the former from any liability to
creditors of the owner who subsequently obtain judgments against the
latter: .d.
Creditors at Large-Fraudulent Transfers.-A creditor at large is
not in a situation to question the bona fides of a transfer of the debtor's
property; nor the right of a third person to take such property; nor his
right to retain the proceeds of its sale : Id.
The statute in relation to conveyances of a debtor's property with the
intent to delay, hinder, and defraud his creditors, has no application to
a fraudulent transfer of such property by any one except the debtor;
and no one can avail himself of the statute except a creditor who is
hindered, delayed, or defrauded thereby. A creditor at large cannot
be hindered by such transfer, within the purview of the statute: Id.
DEED. See Boundary.
DEsCENT.
Personal Status.-When a canon of descent makes the right of
inheritance to depend on personal status, such status must be ascertained
from the lex domicill; but if a statute of descent directs the inherit-
anco of land without regard to personal status, then the law of another
state as to such status can have no influence in determining upon whom
the descent is cast: Ilarvey v. Ball, 32 Ind.
Section 123 of chapter 28, Revised Statutes 1843, which provided,
that "if any man shall marry a woman who has, previous to the mar-
riage, borne an illegitimate child, and after marriage shall acknowledge
such child as his own, such child shall be deemed legitimate to all
VoL. XL.-5
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intents and purposes," did not merely or primarily declare the personal
status of such child, but bestowed upon it the capacities of an heir;
and as a provision governing the descent of lands in this state, it oper-
ated without regard to domicil: Id.
EQUITY. See Husband and Wife; Partnership.
.Power to reform Written Instruments.-The authority which a court
of equity has to reform a written instrument does not extend to any
alteration of a contract, but only to making the contract in which a
mistake has occurred correct, by conforming it to what was actually
agreed upon between the parties: Garner v. Bird, 57 Barb.
Relief from Acts done under a False Impression as to the Facts.-
Courts do not relieve from acts done under a false impression as to the
facts, though under a mistake of the law. The parties must be left
to other remedies founded on fraud if it existed; or, if relief can be
granted in any case for mistake of the law it must be founded on the fact
that the adverse party had parted with nothing of value: Id.
ERROR.
Erroneous Instruction which did not damage the Party complain iig
ofit.-The erroneous instruction of the court in regard to the effect of
a deed of mortgage on the plaintiff's title, is no ground of reversal when
this court can see that the plaintiff had no title on which the jury could
have found in his favor: Dreery v. Cray, 10 Wall.
ESTOPPEL. See Partnership.
What amounts to.-To a suit brought for the partition of a lot, seve-
ral persons who owned the rear part thereof were made parties. In the
decree the description of the property ordered to be sold did not include
the rear of the lot. The whole lot being sold, F., one of the owners of
the rear portion, although knowing of the sale, made no objection, and
accepted her share of the proceeds, but executed no release. Held, that
her acts, in not objecting to the sale and afterwards receiving payment
for her share, estopped her and her representatives from claiming any
interest in the land; and that the sale of the lot under the decree was
to be considered as conveying a good title to the whole lot, although it
was not correctly described in such decree: Garner v. Bird, 57 Barb.
Although a mistake as to the law forms no ground for reforming a
contract, yet where a party, acting under a mistake of law or of fact,
,does acts which mislead the adverse party, he is estopped, as well as if
he was not acting under such mistake: Id.
EVIDENCE. See Boundary.
Declarations qf Strangers to affect Title.-The declarations of a
granter after the grant cannot be received to affect the title of his
grantee; but if the grantee permits the grantor to remain in actual
possession, the grantor's declarations whilst in possession may be given
in evidence: this is not extended to a constructive possession: Pier v.
Duff, 63 Penna.
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What a man in possession of land or goods says, is admissible to prove
in what capacity he is there: Id.
The admission during his tenancy, by one under whom a plaintiff
claims, affects such plaintiff only: Id.
Tenants in common have no community of title and interest which
will make their declarations admissible against each other: Id.
One authorized to sell, but not in actual possession, is a mere broker,
and not even constructively in possession : his declarations are not *ad-
missible to affect his principal: Id.
If there be even very slight evidence of complicity between a grantor
and grantee to defraud creditors, the declarations of one, although after
the grant, are admissible against the other: Id.
FACTOR. See Agent.
FRAUD.
.trchase by one for several"Associates-Disclosure of Real Price.-
Stevenson being in negotiation for oil land, proposed to form a com-
pany, represented that the land could be bought for $12,000, and in-
duced Short to take and pay for a share of it at $1000. Stevenson
bought the land for $6000, without disclosing to his associates the price
which he gave: Held, that on these facts Short could recover his
money back: Short v. Stevenson, 63 Penna.
If Stevenson had disclosed the sum for which the land could be
bought, and which he paid, and refused to sell for less than $12,000,
and Short had agreed to pay 81000 for a share with a knowledge of the
facts, the transaction would have been unimpeachable: Id.
Good faith required that Stevenson should charge his associates no
more for their respective shares than the amount actually paid there-
for : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Payment of Another's Debt.-Where A. sells to B. lands which are
subject to the lien of a judgment, and C., the judgment creditor, agrees
to accept the promise of B. to pay the judgment-debt which is credited
in part payment of the purchase-money, and part of which is paid to C.,
the contract is not within the Statute of Frauds, and the judgment as
against A. is thereby satisfied: Bishears v. Rowe, 46 or 47 Mo.
HABEAS CORPUS.
A party held under arrest by virtue of legal process by a court having
jurisdiction of the person and the offence, cannot be discharged upon a
habeas corpus, on the ground that the statute creating the offence is
unconstitutional: In re Harris, 46 or 47 Mo.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Debtor and Creditor.
Indirect Conveylance by .1usbcmd and 117fe-Afortgage.-To consti-
tute an indirect conveyance of real estate to a married woman by her
husband, within the meaning of R. S. e. 61, § 1, the deed from him
must be made as one step in the conveyance to her, for her benefit, and
for the purpose of getting the estate into her hands: Bean v. Boothby,
57 Me.
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If the grantee of real estate, mortgage it back to secure the purchase-
money, and the mortgagee assign bona fide the mortgage to the wife of
the mortgagor, such assignment will not operate as a discharge of the
mortgage : Rd.
And if, when the mortgage given back for the purchase-money of real
estate is assigned bona fide to the wife of the mortgagor, the husband
quitclaim to her, and she thereupon convey to a third person, by a deed
of warranty, therein referring to the mortgage, "as having been can-
celled by assignment," the mortgage will not thereby become merged,
but it will be upheld: Id.
Fraudulent Conveyance of Proyerty to Wife.-Only a judgment
debtor can seek relief in equity, on the ground that real estate, paid for
by his debtor, has been fraudulently conveyed to the debtor's wife:
Griffn v. Nitcher, 57 Me.
INSURANCE.
Notice of Loss- Waiver of Objections to Form of .otice.-Tbe de-
fendants, by their policy, promised the plaintiff to pay him the amount
insured upon his house, within three months next after a loss and
"notice thereof given," by the plaintiff, "in writing to the secretary
within thirty days from the time such may have happened." In less
than a week after the loss, the defendants' local agent gave the secretary
a written notice of the following tenor: "James R. Works, of - ,
requests me to notify you that his house, insured in policy No. 72,272,
was totally destroyed by fire on the 29th ult. ;" to which the secretary
zeplied by letter, acknowledging the receipt of the notice, and declaring
Lhat it will receive the attention of the directors, at their first aeeting,
and that "in all probability some one will be there to prepare the
necessary papers before that time." In an action on the policy, .eld,
that no objection ever having been made to the notice, all exception
thereto was thereby waived : 111orks v. Farmers' iX. F. Ins. Go., 57 Mc.
Mutual Insurance Company-Deposit Note for Losses and other
Expenses.-Where the charter of a Mutual Insurance Company pro-
vides that the deposit note shall be payable in part, or in whole, when
the directors deem the same requisite for the "payment of losses or
other expenses," and the remainder, after deducting such payment, to
be relinquished to the signer; that every member "shall pay his pro-
portion of all losses and expenses accruing in and to the class in which
his property is embraced ;" and that the policy shall create a lien upon
the property insured for the security of the deposit note, "and the cost
which may accrue in collecting the same ;" an assessment of ninety-five
per cent. additional to the actual losses in a certain class, upon the
premium notes in such class to "meet estimated bad debts, interest,
expenses, and costs of collection," is illegal: York Co. .Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bowden, 57 Me.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Foreclosure of Mortgage by Proceedings Inside the Federal Lines dur-
ing the War-Rights of Parties inside the Confederate Lines not affected
by such Proceedigs.-The equity of redemption of a mortgage is not ex-
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tinguished by proceedings to foreclose the same during the rebellion,
when such proceedings were taken within the Union lines, while the
defendants were absent in the rebel lines, and were prohibited by the
Federal officers from entering the Union lines: Dean v. Nelson, 10 or
11 Wall.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Suspension ofRunning f the Statute bk a Forced Disability-How long
such Suspension was an enforced one.-Although the running of a Statute
of Limitations to the right of suing may be suspended by causes not
mentioned in the statute itself, as, for example, by the fact that the
plaintiff without default of his own, has been disabled by a superior
power from the capacity to sue-still, when by the removal of the dis-
abling power, the right reverts, the question, in a case where the statute
is afterwards set up as a bar to a suit, will be, "how long did the sus-
pension which it caused continue." And the operation of the statute
will not be prevented for a longer time than that during which the sus-
pension was an enforced one: Braun v. Saurwein, 10 or 11 Wall.
MAPs. See Boundary.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Hirngfor 1definite Time-Discharge of Servant-Damages-.Action
of Debt.-By a written contract, Kirk agreed with Hartman to act "as
agent or salesman for stock of (a company) stone, coal and coke and to
travel," &c., Hartman "to pay him $3000 in equal quarterly payments"
and his travelling expenses, and to allow him to take orders from others,
&c. Held, that this was a hiring for a year: Kirk v. .lartman, 63
Penna.
When one is employed as an agent, &c., for no definite time, it is a
hiring at the will of both parties, and the servant may be discharged
without notice: Id.
In a suit on a contract of hiring by a servant discharged before his
term, his being engaged in other profitable business or refusing it if
offered may be shown by the defendant (on whom is the burden) in
mitigation of damages: Id.
Evidence that other agents in similar business at the same places did
much more business than the plaintiff, is not admissible to prove his
negligence or default: Id.
Debt will lie on a contract for service for a determinate time and fixed
compensation, when the servant is dismissed before its expiration: Rd.
Debt lies on any contraot in which the certainty of the sum or duty
appears : I1.
MORTGAGE. See Husband and Wife; International Law.
Foreclosure-Parties.-Parties claiming an interest in the land mort-
gaged, are entitled upon their own application to be made defendants to
a suit to foreclose to protect their own interest, although they may not
have secured the legal title to the equity of redemption. It is sufficient
that they have a substantial interest in the property: Bates v. Miller et
al., 46 or 47 Mo.
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NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier.
OFFICE.
Title to.-If a person is legally entitled to an office of which he is not
in actual possession, it is his property, and he cannot be restricted to
the compensation provided therefor, but may demand the office itself:
City of Aadison v. Korbly, 32 Ind.
A writ of mandate will lie to reinstate a city attorney appointed by
the common council and afterwards wrongfully removed by it from the
office : Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Fraud.
Accounts-Row to be made where one Partner has entire charge of the
Business.-In stating partnership -accounts, where one partner has had
entire charge of the business, he is to be debited with the whole capital
placed in his hands; as well as with the proceeds of sales realized by him:
Gunnell v. Bird, 10 Wall.
If part of the capital consisted of stock, which has been used in the
business, or disposed of, and the proceeds charged against him, he should
be credited with such stock as a disbursement, to the amount at which
it was originally charged against him: Id.
An allegation in an answer entirely impertinent to the bill cannot be
used as evidence for the defendant, even though the plaintiff neglect to
file a replication: Id.
Representation of Partnership whether it existed in fact or not.-
In a suit against two as partners on contract, the question would be
whether they were partners in that contract. Whether they were gene-
ral partners is immaterial: Kirk v. Hartman & Co., 63 Penna.
If one holds himself out or knowingly suffers himself to be held out,
as a partner, on the faith of which others trust or enter into a contract
with the firm, he is responsible, although not a partner: Id.
Estoppels shut the mouth of a party, whether his original act or decla-
ration was intended to deceive or not: Id.
PLEADING. See Contract.
Agency.-In suing upon a promissory note it is sufficient to allege
that the defendant executed the note. It is not necessary to state
whether he signed the note himself or by his agent. The question of
authority is one of evidence, not of pleading: Slivin v. Ripey, 46 or
47 Mo.
PROmIssoRY NOTES.
Defence that Plaintiff is not the Real Owner.-In an action upon a
promissory note, brought since the Code, the defendant has a right to
prove that the plaintiff is not the real owner of the note sued on: Eaton
v. Alger, 57 Barb.
If the plaintiff is not a regular endorsee or holder, but holds the note
merely as agent for the payee, against whom the defendants claim to
have a good defence, they are interested in questioning the plaintiff's
title, and have the right to show his want of interest: Id.
REBELLION. See Contract; International Law.
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RIVER.
Title of Riparian Owner.-The title of a riparian owner on the Al-
legheny (it being a navigable stream), since the reservation of islands
under the Act of 1785, would not include an island opposite his land,
but would extend only to ordinary low-water mark on his own side:
Waihwright v. Mfcullough, 63 Penna.
Between high and low water mark, the title of the riparian owner is
qualified, being subject to the right of navigation over ib and improve-
nient of the stream as a highway; and the riparian owner cannot oc-
cupy to the prejudice of navigation, nor place obstructions on the shore
without express authority from the state: Id.
The Act of April 16th 1858, "to establish high and low water lines
in the Allegheny," &c., is not applicable to disputed boundaries between
private owners, but for regulating the respective rights of the public
and landowners over whose property the right of navigation extends
between high and low water marks : Id.
The wrongful diversion of the waters of a navigable river from its
bed does not extinguish the title of the state nor add to that of indi-
viduals: Id.
Riparian Owner-Ohio River.-The title of the riparian owner on
the Ohio river extends to low-water mark, subject only to the easement
in the public of the right of navigation: Martin v. City of Evansville,
32 Ind.
The city of Evansville, under her charter, has the power, as a police
regulation, to establish water lines and to make reasonable provisions
for the protection of navigation, and for this purpose may prohibit the
erection of buildings below high-water mark which would have a ten-
dency to obstruct navigation; but this power does not extend to private
wharfs above high-water mark: Id.
SET-OFF. See Debtor and Creditor.
SLANDER.
Proof of Repetition.-In an action for slander, it is proper to allow
the plaintiff, after giving evidence to prove the speaking of the action-
able words olleged in the complaint, to prove the repetition of the same
slanderous charge on other occasions, and subsequent to the commence-
ment of the action: Johnson v. Brown, 57 Barb.
Proof of a repetition of the original charge is allowed, not for the
purpose of proving a general malicious feeling or intention on the part
of the defendant towards the plaintiff, but to show the degree of malice
with which the slander involved in the action was uttered: Id.
Qualification of the Slanderous Words.-It is not erroneous for the
judge to charge the jury, in an action for slander, that even if the
words were spoken with the qualification "if reports were true," that
will not change the actionable nature of the words: Id.
TENANT IN COMMON. See Evidence.
TITLE. See Boundary; Evidence.
A person who has conveyed land by deed of warranty mgy acquire a
subsequent title thereto by disseisin: Traip v. Tiraip, 57 Me.
